Sherlock #15
openDDOS támadásban résztvevő ügyfél
50%
Description
Krisztbaum István - Székhely - HU, 7977 Potony, Petőfi utca 120
ONU-ja suspend
Potony 1/4/25
Updated by Krum-Tavasz Boglárka about 1 year ago
-------- Továbbított üzenet --------
Tárgy: Compromised host used for an attack: 109.61.56.120 [~65.8 Mbps]
Dátum: Sun, 21 Sep 2025 20:00:38 -0700
Feladó: NFOservers.com DDoS notifier ddos-response@nfoservers.com
Címzett: registry@dravanet.net
An IP address (109.61.56.120) under your control appears to have attacked one of our customers as part of a coordinated DDoS botnet. We manually reviewed the captures from this attack and do not believe that your IP address was spoofed, based on the limited number of distinct hosts attacking us, the identicality of many attacking IP addresses to ones we've seen in the past, and the non-random distribution of IP addresses. It is possible that this host is one of the following, from the responses that others have sent us:
- A compromised router, such as a D-Link that is running with WAN access enabled; a China Telecom which still allows a default admin username and password; a Netis, with a built-in internet-accessible backdoor (http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/netis-routers-leave-wide-open-backdoor/); or one running an old AirOS version with a vulnerable and exposed administrative interface
- An IPTV device that is vulnerable to compromise (such as HTV), either directly through the default firmware or through a trojan downloaded app
- A compromised webhost, such as one running a vulnerable version of Drupal (for instance, using the vulnerability discussed at https://groups.drupal.org/security/faq-2018-002), WordPress, phpMyAdmin, or zPanel
- A compromised DVR, such as a "Hikvision" brand device (ref: https://www.hikvision.com/en/support/cybersecurity/security-advisory/security-notification-command-injection-vulnerability-in-some-hikvision-products/security-notification-command-injection-vulnerability-in-some-hikvision-products/)
- A compromised IPMI device, such as one made by Supermicro (possibly because it uses the default U/P of ADMIN/ADMIN or because its password was found through an exploit described at http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/06/at-least-32000-servers-broadcast-admin-passwords-in-the-clear-advisory-warns/)
- A compromised Xerox-branded device
- Some other compromised standalone device
- A server with an insecure password that was brute-forced, such as through SSH or RDP
- A server running an improperly secured Hadoop installation
- A server running a pre-13.10.3 GitLab instance that is vulnerable to CVE-2021-22205
- A compromised Microsoft DNS server (through the July 2020 critical vulnerability)
The overall botnet attack was Nx10Gbps in size (with traffic from your host as well as some others) and caused significant packet loss for our clients due to external link saturation. It required an emergency null-route operation on our side to mitigate.
Attacks like this are usually made very short, intentionally, so that they are not as noticeable and slip past certain automatic mitigation systems. From your side, you would be able to observe the attack as a burst of traffic that likely saturated the network adapter of the source device for perhaps 30 seconds. Since the source device is a member of a botnet that is being used for many attacks, you will see many other mysterious bursts of outbound traffic, as well.
This is example traffic from the IP address, as interpreted by the "tcpdump" utility and captured by our router during the attack. Source and destination IP addresses, protocols, and ports are included.
Date/timestamps (at the very left) are UTC.
2025-09-22 02:56:58.101346 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 57, id 59907, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 1028)
109.61.56.120.5270 > 74.91.115.x.53: 2538 updateMA ServFail [31041q][|domain]
0x0000: 4500 0404 ea03 4000 3911 f000 6d3d 3878 E.....@.9...m=8x
0x0010: 4a5b 73d4 1496 0035 03f0 f5a8 09ea e992 J[s....5........
0x0020: 7941 a806 d64a b41b 84e1 bdec 8118 72be yA...J........r.
0x0030: 1f64 1471 f263 713a 7933 cf00 bea3 514c .d.q.cq:y3....QL
0x0040: 2529 c820 dbf8 c3c1 09b0 5183 fe81 d6d1 %)........Q.....
0x0050: 9795 ..
2025-09-22 02:56:58.120501 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 57, id 60436, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 1028)
109.61.56.120.5270 > 74.91.115.x.53: 2538 updateMA ServFail [31041q][|domain]
0x0000: 4500 0404 ec14 4000 3911 edef 6d3d 3878 E.....@.9...m=8x
0x0010: 4a5b 73d4 1496 0035 03f0 f5a8 09ea e992 J[s....5........
0x0020: 7941 a806 d64a b41b 84e1 bdec 8118 72be yA...J........r.
0x0030: 1f64 1471 f263 713a 7933 cf00 bea3 514c .d.q.cq:y3....QL
0x0040: 2529 c820 dbf8 c3c1 09b0 5183 fe81 d6d1 %)........Q.....
0x0050: 9795 ..
2025-09-22 02:56:58.122725 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 57, id 60484, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 1028)
109.61.56.120.5270 > 74.91.115.x.53: 2538 updateMA ServFail [31041q][|domain]
0x0000: 4500 0404 ec44 4000 3911 edbf 6d3d 3878 E....D@.9...m=8x
0x0010: 4a5b 73d4 1496 0035 03f0 f5a8 09ea e992 J[s....5........
0x0020: 7941 a806 d64a b41b 84e1 bdec 8118 72be yA...J........r.
0x0030: 1f64 1471 f263 713a 7933 cf00 bea3 514c .d.q.cq:y3....QL
0x0040: 2529 c820 dbf8 c3c1 09b0 5183 fe81 d6d1 %)........Q.....
0x0050: 9795 ..
2025-09-22 02:56:58.127563 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 57, id 60588, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 1028)
109.61.56.120.5270 > 74.91.115.x.53: 2538 updateMA ServFail [31041q][|domain]
0x0000: 4500 0404 ecac 4000 3911 ed57 6d3d 3878 E.....@.9..Wm=8x
0x0010: 4a5b 73d4 1496 0035 03f0 f5a8 09ea e992 J[s....5........
0x0020: 7941 a806 d64a b41b 84e1 bdec 8118 72be yA...J........r.
0x0030: 1f64 1471 f263 713a 7933 cf00 bea3 514c .d.q.cq:y3....QL
0x0040: 2529 c820 dbf8 c3c1 09b0 5183 fe81 d6d1 %)........Q.....
0x0050: 9795 ..
2025-09-22 02:56:58.171792 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 57, id 61499, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 1028)
109.61.56.120.5270 > 74.91.115.x.53: 2538 updateMA ServFail [31041q][|domain]
0x0000: 4500 0404 f03b 4000 3911 e9c8 6d3d 3878 E....;@.9...m=8x
0x0010: 4a5b 73d4 1496 0035 03f0 f5a8 09ea e992 J[s....5........
0x0020: 7941 a806 d64a b41b 84e1 bdec 8118 72be yA...J........r.
0x0030: 1f64 1471 f263 713a 7933 cf00 bea3 514c .d.q.cq:y3....QL
0x0040: 2529 c820 dbf8 c3c1 09b0 5183 fe81 d6d1 %)........Q.....
0x0050: 9795 ..
(The final octet of our customer's IP address is masked in the above output because some automatic parsers become confused when multiple IP addresses are included. The value of that octet is "212".)
Based on the size, number of samples, and timestamps of received packets from your host in our capture, we estimate that your host was sending 65.8 Mbps of attack traffic at the peak of this coordinated attack. The peak of the attack may have lasted only a few seconds. (Most traffic graphing systems show numbers that are averaged over 30s or 5m, and it may appear to have been less in such a system; but, our estimate is generally accurate as a minimum bound.)
-John
President
NFOservers.com
(We're sending out so many of these notices, and seeing so many auto-responses, that we can't go through this email inbox effectively. If you have follow-up questions, please contact us at noc@nfoe.net.)